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Review of FDA Regulations
The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association and thirty-
seven individual drug manufacturers sought pre-enforcement re-
view1 of regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of the
Food and Drug Administration. Petitioners claimed that the
regulations, which concerned labeling requirements for prescrip-
tion drugs, 2 exceeded the statutory authority granted to the
Commissioner by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The Su-
preme Court held that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act3 did
not prohibit suit under the Administrative Procedure Act 4 and
Declaratory Judgment Act,5 whereunder federal district courts
have discretionary jurisdiction to entertain actions for pre-en-
forcement review of FDA regulations." The Court further held
that since the issue of the statutory validity of the labeling
regulations was ripe for judicial review, the district court had
exercised proper discretion in hearing this particular suit.7 In
1. "Pre-enforcement review" is a determination of the validity of
a regulation before any attempt has been made to enforce it. Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139 n.1 (1967).
2. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act requires that manufacturers
print the "established" name of a drug "prominently and in type at
least half as large as that used thereon for any proprietary name" on
labels and other printed materials. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21
U.S.C. § 352(e) (1) (B) (1964). The Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW) designates the "established" name, Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352(e) (2) (1964). The "proprietary" name
is the brand name under which a drug is marketed. The regulations
required that the established name accompany the proprietary name
each time the proprietary name appeared on any label of, or advertise-
ment for, a prescription drug. 21 C.F.R,. §§ 1.104(g) (1), 1.105 (b) (1)
(1967).
3. The regulations were issued under the power granted by Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (1964): "The authority to
promulgate regulations for the efficient enforcement of this chapter,
except as otherwise provided in this section, is vested in the Secretary."
The Secretary of HEW delegated this power to the Commissioner of the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 22 Fed. Reg. 1051 (1957); 25
Fed. Reg. 8625 (1960).
4. 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964) (recodified in Pub. Law 89-554, 80 Stat.
378).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964).
6. Some FDA regulations are subject to pre-enforcement review
only in the courts of appeals. See notes 18 & 19 infra.
7. The district court found that the regulations were in excess of
the Commissioner's statutory authority. Abbott Laboratories v. Cele-
breeze, 228 F. Supp. 855 (D. Del. 1964). The court of appeals reversed
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two companion cases, the Court held that FDA regulations which
dealt with the definition of "color additives" were also ripe for
judicial review," but that a regulation which concerned the
right of FDA employees to inspect manufacturing facilities was
not.9 Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
With regard to judicial review of agency action, the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act provides:
Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or
(2) agency action is by law committed to agency discretion-
(a) Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency
action, or adversely affected, or aggrieved by such action within
the meaning of any relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial
review thereof .... (c) Every agency action made reviewable
by statute and every agency action for which there is no other
adequate remedy in any court shall be subject to judicial
review.' 0
The meaning intended by the words "Except so far as statutes
preclude judicial review" is not clear from the legislative his-
tory of the Act. The House Committee's Report indicated that it
for lack of jurisdiction. Abbott Laboratories v. Celebreeze, 352 F.2d 286
(3d Cir. 1965). The Court in the instant case reversed the court of
appeals' decision as to jurisdiction, and remanded to the court of ap-
peals for a consideration of the merits.
8. Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167 (1967). The Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act defines a color additive as a
dye, pigment, or other substance ... [which] when added or
applied to a food, drug, or cosmetic, or to the human body or
any part thereof is capable (alone or through reaction with
other substance) of imparting color thereto ....
21 U.S.C. § 321(t) (1) (1964). The regulations, issued under the Com-
missioner's general rule-making power, implemented the definition to
include "any component of a color additive mixture that is not of itself
a color additive and has been intentionally mixed therein to facilitate
the use of the mixture . . . " 21 C.F.R. § 8.1 (m) (1967). "A substance
that, when applied to the human body results in coloring .... Lip-
stick, rouge, eye makeup colors, and related cosmetics intended for
coloring the human body are 'color additives.'" 21 C.F.R. § 8.1(f)
(1967). A third regulation concerned the statutory exemption for hair
dyes, which provides that hair dyes are exempt from statutory coverage
if their labels prescribe a "patch test" for determining whether the dye
will cause skin irritation. 21 U.S.C. § 361(e) (1964). The regulation
provides that hair dyes are exempt only if the "patch test" is an effective
safeguard. 21 C.F.R. § 8.1(u) (1967).
9. This regulation was at issue in Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 158 (1967). The regulation was issued under the Commis-
sioner's general rule-making power and provided that the Commissioner
could suspend certification services if FDA employees were refused "free
access to all manufacturing facilities, processes, and formulae involved
in the manufacture of color additives and intermediates from which such
color additives are derived . . . ." 21 C.F.R. § 8.28 (1967).




required a statutory scheme which clearly superseded judicial
review.1 However, a statement by the Attorney General indi-
cated that much less evidence of intent is required: "A statute
may in terms preclude judicial review or be interpreted as mani-
festing a congressional intent to preclude review."'12 Represent-
ing a compromise between the position of the House Committee
and that of the Attorney General, the standard provided by the
case law emphasizes the importance of legislative history. In
Heikkila v. Barber,1" the Supreme Court stated:
[T~he broadly remedial purposes of the Act counsel a judicial
attitude of hospitality towards . . .judicial review .... Each
statute in question must be examined individually; its purpose
and history as well as its text are to be considered in deciding
whether the courts were intended to provide relief for those
aggrieved by administrative action. 'Mere failure to provide forjudicial intervention is not conclusive; neither is the presence
of language which appears to bar it.14
In Heikkila and Schilling v. Rogers,'1 5 the Court held that judi-
cial review was unavailable even though the statute in ques-
tion did not clearly preclude review on its face. In both cases
the Court engaged in an extensive analysis of the legislative
history of the statute in question, and concluded that Congress
intended to preclude judicial review. However, the Court al-
lowed review in United States v. Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion16 and Rusk v. Cort,'7 holding in both cases that neither the
11. To preclude review under this bill a statute, if not specific
in withdrawing such review, must upon its face give clear and
convincing evidence of an intent to withhold it. The mere fail-
ure to provide specifically for judicial review is certainly no
evidence of an intent to withhold review.
H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1946).
12. S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 229 (1946).
13. 345 U.S. 229 (1953). Petitioner sought review of a deportation
order pursuant to the Immigration Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 889. The Court
held that the Administrative Procedure Act was not applicable and that
review could only be obtained through a writ of habeas corpus.
14. Id. at 232-33.
15. 363 U.S. 666 (1960). The cases involved the Trading with the
Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 7 (1964). Petitioner sought judicial re-
view of an administrative determination that he was not eligible for
the return of property confiscated during World War II. The Court
held that the agency determination was unreviewable because the first
two exceptions of the Administrative Procedure Act applied, i.e., that
the Trading with the Enemy Act precluded review and that the de-
termination was "by law committed to agency discretion." See note 10
supra and accompanying text.
16. 337 U.S. 426 (1949). The Court held that § 9 of the Interstate
Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 9 (1964), did not give complete finality to
the Commission's determination, and that judicial review was allowable.
17. 369 U.S. 367 (1962). The case involved the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1503 (1964). The Act provided: "A
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text of the statute in question, nor a detailed examination of
its legislative history, provided the necessary "clear and convinc-
ing evidence" of a congressional intent to withhold review.
The issue of judicial review under the Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act is complicated by the fact that the Act specifically
provides for pre-enforcement review of some regulations,' 8 but
not the type involved in the instant case.19 The paragraph con-
taining the special review procedure is followed by a savings
clause which states: "The remedies provided for in this subsec-
tion shall be in addition to and not in substitution for other reme-
dies provided by law. '2 0 The House Report on the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act stated that this clause
saves as a method to review a regulation placed in effect by
the Secretary whatever rights exist to initiate a historical
proceeding in equity to enjoin enforcement of the regulation,
and whatever rights exist to initiate a declaratory judgment
proceeding.21
A literal reading of the House Report indicates that the savings
clause was included in order to allow pre-enforcement review
of any regulation, provided that the requisite elements for a
proceeding in equity were present.22 If, however, the words "a
final determination by the Attorney General that any ... person is not
entitled to admission to the United States shall be subject to review...
in habeas corpus proceedings and not otherwise." 8 U.S.C. § 1503(c)
(1964).
The petitioner sought review of the Secretary of State's ruling that
he had lost his citizenship by remaining outside of the United States for
purposes of avoiding military service. The Court held that review was
available under the Administrative Procedure Act. 369 U.S. at 375.
18. A person "adversely affected" by certain regulations can peti-
tion to a court of appeals for judicial review. The petition must be
filed within 90 days after formal issuance of a regulation. The court
determines if the Secretary of HEW has "substantial evidence" to sup-
port his position. If not, the court has jurisdiction to set aside the
Secretary's order "in whole or in part, temporarily or permanently."
21 U.S.C. § 371(f) (1964).
19. 21 U.S.C. § 371(f) (1964) provides for review of regulations
passed pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 341 (1964) (identity and quality standards
for food); § 343 (j) (misbranded food purporting to serve special dietary
purposes); § 344(a) (conditions imposed on the manufacture of foods
as the result of health requirements); § 346 (tolerance for pesticides);
§ 351(b) (deviations from strength, quality, or purity standards for
drugs); § 352(d) (warnings with respect to habit-forming drugs); §
352(h) (packing and labeling of deteriorative drugs); § 356 (certifica-
tion of drugs containing insulin); § 357 (antibiotic drugs). Denials of
certification for new drugs are also reviewable in the courts of appeals
under 21 U.S.C. § 355(h) (1964).
20. 21 U.S.C. § 371(f) (6) (1964).
21. H.R. REP. No. 2139, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1938).
22. The elements necessary for a proceeding in equity were not
entirely clear at the time the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act was origin-
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regulation placed in effect by the Secretary" were intended to
be read with reference to the specific regulations mentioned in
the preceding paragraph of the Act, which sets out the special
review procedure, the savings clause would encompass only
those regulations which are also subject to the special review
procedure.23 Reading the clause in this way, the statute is silent
as to judicial review of some regulations, but specifically pre-
serves judicial review of others.
In similar situations under other statutes, the Court has been
inconsistent. In Schilling v. Rogers, the Court indicated that
the specification of certain remedies implied a congressional pur-
pose to exclude all others.24 In Rusk v. Cort, the Court held
that the specification of one type of remedy did not make that
remedy exclusive. 25 However, prior to Abbott Laboratories there
was no clear indication of the Court's interpretation of the text
and legislative history of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
since the instant case represents the first attempt to obtain pre-
enforcement review other than by the special review procedure. 20
Even if it is determined that there is statutory jurisdiction, a
particular action must be "ripe" for adjudication before review
will be allowed. Courts traditionally attempt to avoid entan-
gling themselves in abstract controversies which are more prop-
erly dealt with outside the courtrocm.2 7 On the other hand, a
ally passed. See 83 CONG. REC. 7891-99 (1938). Presumably, they in-
cluded such elements as the lack of an adequate remedy at law, the
possibility of irreparable injury, the presence of an actual case or con-
troversy, and an appropriateness for judicial resolution.
23. This interpretation of the savings clause was made by the
dissent in Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 180-82.
It [the savings clause] was intended to save the remedies of
injunction and declaratory judgment where the agency promul-
gated a... regulation without the hearings and findings needed
to permit review in the Court of Appeals.
387 U.S. at 180 n.5. 21 U.S.C. § 371 (e) (1964) provides for public no-
tice, a public hearing, and written findings of fact before the issuance of
any regulation subject to the special review procedure. See note 19
supra.
24. 363 U.S. at 674. Plaintiff claimed that the Trading with the
Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 7 (1964), did not preclude review. The
Act specifically provided for review of some agency determinations, but
not the determination which affected plaintiff.
25. 369 U.S. 367 (1962).
26. For a somewhat partisan explanation of this lack of precedent,
see Sweeney, The "Generic Everytime" Case: Prescription Drug Industry
in Extremis, 21 FOOD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 226 (1966).
27. See generally Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961); Massachusetts
v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); 3 K. DAvis, ADiCm=STATmv LAW TREATISE
§§ 22.01-.10 (1958); Jaffe, Ripeness and Reviewable Orders in Adminis-
trative Law, 61 Mic. L. REv. 1273 (1963).
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party might suffer irreparable injury if judicial action is un-
necessarily delayed. Thus, ripeness for review depends on an
evaluation of both the appropriateness of an issue for adjudica-
tion and the hardship of denying relief.28
The distinction between legislative and interpretative regu-
lations is sometimes relevant to a determination of ripeness.29
Legislative regulations are issued pursuant to a legislative
power granted to an agency by a legislative body.30 Like stat-
utes, they have the force of law as soon as they are promul-
gated. 31 Interpretative regulations merely represent the opin-
ion of an agency as to the meaning of a statute and, theoretically,
have no legal effect in themselves.32 The distinction is impor-
tant primarily because the scope of judicial review is more re-
stricted as to legislative regulations. Legislative regulations are
valid if they are within the statutory power granted to the
agency and are "reasonable."3 3 However, interpretative regula-
tions are not necessarily valid if they are reasonable because a
court will ordinarily feel free to substitute its own opinion as to
the meaning of a statute for that of the agency.34 Thus, a legis-
28. See generally authorities cited note 27 supra.
29. See American President Lines v. Federal Maritime Corm'n,
316 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1963). But see note 56 infra. Cases which did
not involve formal regulations, but in which review was denied because
of the interpretative nature of the agency rule include First Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. SEC, 358 F.2d 358 (5th Cir. 1966); Helco Prods. Co. v.
McNutt, 137 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
30. The commentators disagree as to whether the power must be
explicitly granted. 1 K. DAVIs, ADmwnsTATm LAw TREATISE § 5.03
(1958) (need not be explicit); Brown, Regulations, Reenactment, and
the Revenue Acts, 54 HA~v. L. REV. 377, 384-85 (1941) (must be ex-
plicit).
31. See authorities cited note 30 supra; see also American President
Lines v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 316 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Union
Elec. Co. v. United States, 305 F.2d 850, 853 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
32. See American President Lines v. Federal Maritime Comm'n,
316 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Boynton v. Pedrick, 136 F. Supp. 888
(S.D.N.Y. 1954), affd, 228 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
938 (1956); 1 K. DAvis, ADNnmsTRAT=nv LAW TR ATISE §§ 5.03-.04 (1958).
33. "Reasonable" is used in the same sense as it is used by the
Court in reviewing a statute for an alleged lack of due process. In
American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232 (1936), the Court
stated that it would not inquire into the wisdom of an administrative
regulation.
34. See American President Lines v. Federal Maritime Comm'n,
316 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Comptroller of Treasury v. M.E. Rockhill,
Inc., 205 Md. 226, 234, 107 A.2d 93, 98 (1954). The reliance placed upon
an agency's interpretation of a statute depends on a number of factors,
such as the relative expertise of the court and agency on a particular
subject, and the length of time a regulation has been in effect. Coin-
1968]
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lative regulation will ordinarily impose greater hardship be-
cause the scope of review is more restricted, and the regulated
person's chances of succeeding in a determination on the merits
is correspondingly diminished. Therefore, there is more pressure
on a person subject to a legislative regulation to comply with the
regulation rather than risk losing in an enforcement suit, and
the person subject to such a regulaticn presents a stronger argu-
ment for the possibility of irreparable injury if pre-enforcement
review is denied.
In determining whether an administrative regulation is ripe
for pre-enforcement review, the Supreme Court has emphasized
the practical effect of the regulation, but has never spoken in
terms of the distinction between legislative and interpretative
regulations.35 In Columbia Broadcasting System v. United
States,36 CBS sought pre-enforcement review of FCC "legisla-
tive"37 regulations which provided that stations which entered
into certain types of network contracts, such as those CBS main-
tained with its affiliates, would be denied a license. Since the
regulations were not directly enforceable against CBS, the com-
pany would have had no alternative remedy unless one of its
affiliates had decided to challenge the regulations and CBS had
intervened.38  CBS presented evidence that it was threatened
with wholesale violation of its contracts, and the Court issued
an injunction restraining enforcement until a decision could be
had on the merits. United States v. Storer Broadcasting Com-
pany 9 involved a legislative regulation of the FCC which limited
the number of television stations that could be licensed to a
single person. Petitioner already owned the maximum allowed.
The Court allowed pre-enforcement review, holding that peti-
tioner was aggrieved insofar as he could not plan his business
affairs until the validity of the regulation was determined. Al-
missioner v. Estate of Sternberger, 348 U.S. 187 (1955); 1 K. DAVIs, An-
1mmIsTRATIvE LAW TREATISE §§ 5.05-.07 (1958).
35. The Court, however, has apparently recognized the distinction
without saying so in cases which did not deal with ripeness. As to the
scope of review, compare American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States,
229 U.S. 232 (1936) (legislative regulation), with Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (interpretative regulation). See also 1 K. DAviS,
ADVAnsTRATIvE LAW TREATISE §§ 5.03-.04 (1958).
36. 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
37. Professor Davis cites these regulations as an example of legis-
lative regulations passed by an agency even though the agency did not
have any explicit power to promulgate legislative regulations. 1 K.
DAVIs, AnDMIsTaAT=rE LAW TRATISE § 5.03 n.2 (1958).
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
39. 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
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though the dissenting opinions in CBS and Storer maintained
that the Court should avoid interfering with the administrative
process before it became finalized by a specific application of the
regulation in question, they did not mention the distinction be-
tween legislative and interpretative regulations.
In Frozen Food Express v. United States,40 petitioner chal-
lenged an interpretative order of the ICC which listed commodi-
ties that could be transported without ICC supervision. Peti-
tioner claimed that the commodities he was transporting should
also have been listed. The Court allowed pre-enforcement re-
view, reasoning that since violation entailed possible criminal
penalties,4 1 and since petitioner could not properly plan his
business affairs prior to a determination of the order's validity,
he would suffer irreparable injury if pre-enforcement review
were denied. The majority opinion did not discuss the distinction
between legislative and interpretative regulations, and the dis-
sent merely treated the fact that the regulation was not legisla-
tive as one reason why review should have been denied.
Thus, the standard which emerges from CBS, Storer, and
Frozen Food is that a showing that petitioner is suffering severe
business inconvenience because of an agency regulation, whether
interpretative or legislative, is sufficient to make the issue of
that regulation's validity ripe for judicial review. If there are
factors militating against review, they will be weighed against
the business inconvenience and any other factors in favor of
the petitioner.
In the instant case, the government argued that the special
review procedure which the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act pro-
vided for some regulations implied a congressional intent to pre-
clude pre-enforcement review of all other regulations42 and
further, that pre-enforcement review, if allowed, would delay
40. 351 U.S. 40 (1956).
41. Willful violation of an order was punishable by a $100 fine
for the first offense and not more than $500 for any subsequent offenses.
49 U.S.C. § 10(1) (1964).
42. The government cited Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc.,
339 U.S. 594 (1950), to support its position. Petitioner in Ewing was
seeking review of an FDA finding that there was probable cause to
believe that he was distributing "adulterated" drugs in interstate com-
merce. In denying review, the Court stated, "This highly selective
manner in which Congress has provided for judicial review reinforces
the inference that the only review of the issue of probable cause which
Congress granted was the one provided in the ... [enforcement suit]."
339 U.S. at 600-01. Although this language seems to support the Govern-
ment's argument, Ewing is clearly distinguishable on its facts from the
instant case especially since no formal regulation was at issue in Ewing.
1968]
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enforcement of the Act. The Court, however, reasoned that
the special review procedure was merely intended to enlarge
the scope of judicial review of certain agency factual determina-
tions. 43 The Court held that the statutory scheme failed to pro-
vide the "clear and convincing evidence" of an intent to with-
hold review which is necessary under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act; and that, in fact, the savings clause and its legisla-
tive history constituted a positive indication that pre-enforcement
review of all regulations should be allowed. The Court further
reasoned that a pre-enforcement challenge would facilitate en-
forcement of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act since it would
result in immediate compliance by manufacturers if the regula-
tions were found to be valid, or allow the FDA to quickly revise
its regulations if they were found to be invalid.
In determining that the "labeling"44 and "definition"45
regulations were ripe for judicial review, but that the "inspec-
tion"46 regulation was not, the Court emphasized three deter-
mining factors: The penalties which could result from viola-
tion, the burden of compliance, and the need for a concrete fac-
tual setting. Violation of the labeling and definition regulations,
unlike the inspection regulation, entadled possible criminal pen-
alties.47  Compliance with the labeling regulations required sub-
stantial investments in new supplies in order to change labels
and other printed matter.48 Similarly, compliance with the defi-
nition regulations required that petitioners keep detailed rec-
ords49 and make various chemical and physical tests.50 The in-
43. The Court stated that the "substantial evidence" test provided
by the special review procedure afforded "considerably more generousjudicial review than the 'arbitrary and capricious' test available in the
traditional injunctive suit." 387 U.S. at 143. See, e.g., Schilling v.
Rogers, 363 U.S. 666, 676 (1960); United States v. Interstate Commerce
Comm'n, 337 U.S. 426, 431 (1949); Friedman v. Schwellenbach, 159 F.2d
22, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 838 (1947); 4 K. DAvis,
ADMnmiSTRATVE LAW TuxATisE §§ 29.01-.11 (1958).
44. See note 2 supra.
45. See note 8 supra.
46. See note 9 supra.
47. Violation of either the labeling or definition regulations could
entail "imprisonment for not more than one year, or a fine of not more
than $1000, or both." 21 U.S.C. § 333 (1964). Violation could also en-
tail injunction proceedings, 21 U.S.C. § :332 (1964); or seizure of the
goods, 21 U.S.C. § 334(a) (1964). The only immediate result of violat-
ing the "inspection" regulation would be a denial of certification serv-
ices. See note 9 supra.
48. 387 U.S. at 152.
49. 21 C.F.R. §§ 8.26, 8.1 (f) (m), 8.4(c), 8.50(c) (1967).
50. 21 C.F.R. § 8.4(c) (1967). One petitioner alleged that it would
cost him 42 million dollars to make color additive tests.
[Vol. 52:872
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spection regulation, however, required no advance action. In
fact, many facilities of manufacturers were subject to inspection
before this regulation was issued.51 The Court stated that the
issue with respect to all the regulations was legal rather than
factual-whether the regulations were beyond the power granted
to the Commissioner by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. How-
ever, the Court found that the validity of the inspection regu-
lations could not be determined without an understanding of
the enforcement problems encountered by the FDA, as well as
an understanding of the need for various sorts of supervision
required to effectuate the purposes of the Act. In the Court's
view, those factors could more properly be appraised in the
context of a specific application of the regulation than in the
generalized framework of a pre-enforcement suit.
The instant case indicates that the Court intends to continue
its ad hoc approach to the applicability of the Administrative
Procedure Act, with particular emphasis on the legislative his-
tory of the statute in question. The Court's conclusion that
there is no persuasive indication of an intent to preclude review
is reasonable. The Government's interpretation of the savings
clause is certainly no more convincing than that of the peti-
tioners. Thus, viewed most favorably to the government, the
Act and its legislative history are inconclusive as to the avail-
ability of review. The cases interpreting the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act have required some persuasive evidence of an intent
to preclude review in either the text or legislative history of
the statute in question. Thus, the Court's holding in the instant
case is consistent with the prior case law.
Once it is determined that there is jurisdiction for pre-en-
forcement review, the requirement of ripeness presents the
Court with a flexible means of balancing the policies for and
against allowing review. In the instant case, the principal pol-
icy argument against allowing review was the need for speedy
enforcement of an Act which is vital to the public health. How-
ever, the nature of the regulations was such that the Court's
decision does not materially impair the protection afforded the
public by the Act. The labeling regulations were intended to
make consumers aware that familiar brand name drugs can be
purchased at lower prices under their "established" names. The
intended effect of these regulations would probably not be felt
for a considerable period of time even if they went into effect
51. 21 U.S.C. § 374(a) (1964) provides that FDA employees must
be allowed to enter and inspect factories or warehouses of manufacturers.
19681
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
immediately.5 2 The definition regulations encompass a very lim-
ited area in comparison with the broad field of activities covered
by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Any possible danger to
the public health resulting from an injunction restraining en-
forcement of these regulations is amply provided for by other
provisions of the Act. Moreover, petitioners in the instant case
presented a more forceful case for the likelihood of irreparable
injury in the event of a denial of pre-enforcement relief than
was presented in either Frozen Food or Storer.53 On the other
hand, the inspection regulation in Toilet Goods, which the Court
refused to enjoin, is not only directly and immediately related to
the public health, but also encompasses a broad scope of poten-
tially harmful activities.54 Yet, in such a situation, the burden
of compliance is not undue.
By determining that the labeling and definition regulations
were ripe for review, but that the inspection regulation was not,
the Court was consistent with Storer and Frozen Food without
undermining the policies of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act.55
The Court did not discuss the government's argument that
52. See generally Sweeney, The "Generic Everytime" Case: Pre-
scription Drug Industry in Extremis, 21 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 226
(1966); Note, Drug Amendments of 1962-Generic Name Prescribing:
Drug Price Panacea, 16 STAN. L. Rv. 64:9 (1964); Note, Drug Amend-
ments of 1962, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1082 (1963).
53. United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956)
(business planning inconvenience); Frozen Food Express v. United
States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956) (possible criminal penalties).
In the instant case, the penalties for violation were more serious
than in Frozen Food. Compare note 41 with note 47 supra. Furthermore,
in the instant case the Court went into great detail about the risks of
violation and the burden of compliance. See text accompanying notes
47-50 supra. The Court also noted that petitioners in the instant case,
unlike petitioners in Storer or Frozen Fcod, "deal in a sensitive indus-
try, in which public confidence in their products is especially important.
To require them to challenge these regulations only as a defense to an
action brought by the Government might harm them severely and un-
necessarily." 387 U.S. at 153.
54. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
55. The Court did not mention cases dealing with ripeness in the
area of constitutional law, apparently intending to apply a different
standard of ripeness in the area of constitutional law than in adminis-
trative law.
The government's brief cited International Longshoreman's Union
v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1954), and United Public Workers v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75 (1947). The Court denied review in both cases, holding that
the controversy was not ripe even though petitioners in those cases, as
in the instant case, presented a strong case for judicial review in order
to avoid possible irreparable injury.
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pre-enforcement review should be denied because the regula-
tions were interpretative rather than legislative. The distinction
between legislative and interpretative regulations should not be
decisive in a determination of whether regulations are ripe for
pre-enforcement review. The Court's failure even to discuss the
distinction indicates that it arguably will not be decisive.5 The
determination of whether regulations are ripe for pre-enforce-
ment review should depend on what practical effects the issu-
ance of regulations has on the petitioners. It can readily be
seen that some interpretative regulations would have a more
serious practical impact on a petitioner prior to enforcement
than some legislative regulations would have. In the instant
case, for example, the Court looked to the practical effects of
the regulations and determined that the legislative regulation-
the inspection regulation 57-was not ripe for review, but that
the regulations which purported to interpret the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act-the labeling and definition regulations58-were
ripe. On the other hand, it is obvious that the labeling and
definition regulations would have imposed an even more se-
rious practical impact on petitioner's business, prior to enforce-
ment, if they were considered to be legislative rather than
56. American President Lines v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 316
F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1963), held that review of an agency interpretative
regulation was not proper even though the regulation probably had a
practical effect on petitioner's business. The court of appeals stated
that even if the regulation did have a practical effect on the plaintiff's
business, the regulation merely represented the opinion of the agency's
legal staff and was not binding on anyone. The instant Court's practical
approach to the problem of pre-enforcement review as well as its fail-
ure to discuss the difference between legislative and interpretative reg-
ulations seem to indicate that American President Lines is no longer
good law.
57. The inspection regulation had all the characteristics of a legis-
lative regulation. It was issued under the power given to the Commis-
sioner of Food and Drugs to issue "regulations for the efficient enforce-
ment of" the Act. 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (1964). The penalty for violating
the regulation was specified in the regulation. The regulation did not
purport to interpret any section of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
58. These regulations had some characteristics of legislative regu-
lations. They were issued under the power to promulgate "regulations
for the efficient enforcement of" the Act. 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (1964).
They were issued according to the formal rule-making procedure of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1003 (1964), which includes
requirements of notice to interested parties in order to allow them op-
portunity to object in writing. The Administrative Procedure Act, how-
ever, exempts interpretative regulations from the formal rule-making
procedure. 5 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1964). The regulations were interpre-
tative insofar as they merely purported to interpret certain sections of
1968]
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interpretative.59 Thus, the distinction between legislative and
interpretative regulations is at least a factor to be considered
in a determination of ripeness. It would seem that the Court
should have indicated what weight, if any, it will give to the
distinction in future cases.
The dissent in Abbott Laboratories expressed a fear of plac-
ing a discretionary injunctive power in the hands of federal dis-
trict judges, arguing that the inevitable result would be to delay
enforcement of an Act which is vital to the public health. 0
The alternative would be to leave a broad discretionary power
in the hands of FDA officials. There would seem to be no more
basis for assuming that district judges would use their injunctive
power in a manner detrimental to the public health,61 than for
assuming that FDA officials would abuse their potentially coer-
cive power. FDA officials are no doubt better equipped to
deal with highly technical problems; but district judges are cer-
tainly more competent to handle questions of statutory inter-
pretation. 2  Furthermore, it would seem to be unhealthy for
the federal judiciary system to have the Supreme Court base its
decision on a distrust of federal district judges.
It is submitted that the Supreme Court's decision in Abbott
Laboratories was correct on the facts, and that the reasons given
were sound and well-considered. The purposes of the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act will not be undermined if district judges
are selective in their issuance of injunctions, confining them to
situations in which the regulations are not vital to the public
health, and in which the plaintiff will suffer a genuine hardship
if pre-enforcement review is denied. The Supreme Court's as-
sumption that the district judges will so confine themselves,
even if ill-founded, is a necessary adjunct of the federal judicial
system.
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and did not specify any penalty for
violation other than the penalties provided for violating the sections of
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act which they purported to interpret.
59. See text accompanying notes 34 & 35 supra.
60. 387 U.S. at 176, 177, 182, 183, 200.
61. Compare 387 U.S. at 156, with the dissent, note 60 supra and
accompanying text.
62. The Court stated that the definition regulation appeared "to
be susceptible of a reasoned comparison with the statutory mandate
without inquiry into factual issues that ought to be first ventilated be-
fore the agency," 387 U.S. at 171 n.1.
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